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During the first week of December, President Trump convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy encapsulates the central feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—even as this fits with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, commenting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This shift is consequential, but observers warn it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Disinterest and Strains

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has broken out with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Diplomacy and Conditional Involvement

A comparable standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Experts describe the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.